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Richard Posner wrote that the theory of judicial restraint is dead and that the liberal deci-
sions of the Warren Court killed it.  Posner should have placed some of the blame on himself and
other former Warren Court and early Burger Court clerks who joined the legal academy.  As
young law professors, they rejected legal process theory that they had learned in law school from
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks at Harvard, Alexander Bickel and Harry Wellington at Yale, and
from process theory’s patron saints on the Court—Felix Frankfurter and John M. Harlan.  Legal
process theory yielded to new theories, including rights protection (John Hart Ely and Owen Fiss),
Critical Legal Studies (Duncan Kennedy and Mark Tushnet), and law and economics (Richard
Posner and Guido Calabresi).
This symposium piece explores the rise and fall of legal process theory as well as the scholar-
ship of former Warren Court and early Burger Court clerks who nearly killed it.  It also suggests
that there could be a revival of a process-based judicial restraint based on a new generation of late
Burger Court/early Rehnquist Court clerks-turned-academics who came of age during the mid-
1980s.  These law clerks rejected judicial supremacy and adopted popular constitutionalism and
other democratic approaches to constitutional interpretation.  Popular constitutionalism is
inspired by the same faith in the democratic political process as the judicial restraint advocated by
James Bradley Thayer, Felix Frankfurter, and Alexander Bickel.
INTRODUCTION
  In The Rise and Fall of Judicial Restraint, Richard Posner declared that
Thayerian judicial restraint was dead.1  He even identified the theory’s cause
of death: the liberal decisions of the Warren Court.2  Posner’s critique in
many ways reflects conventional wisdom.  Once the Warren Court let the
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1 Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV. 519, 553
(2012).
2 Id. at 546 (“Its judicial demise is attributable to the exuberant activism of the War-
ren Court, which in the 1950s and 1960s powered a major, left-leaning expansion of consti-
tutional law.”).
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genie out of the bottle in Brown v. Board of Education3 and declared itself the
“ultimate interpreter of the Constitution” in Baker v. Carr,4 we entered an
uninterrupted era of judicial supremacy.
Posner’s article, part of a California Law Review symposium, recognized
that the theory of judicial restraint has many definitions.5  Posner focused on
James Bradley Thayer’s constitutional theory that the courts should overturn
a federal statute only in extreme situations (i.e., when the statute was uncon-
stitutional “beyond reasonable doubt”6).7  Thayer believed that judicial deci-
sions that invalidated federal laws undermined public participation in the
democratic political process.8  Posner traced the rise of Thayerian judicial
restraint through the jurisprudence of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Louis
Brandeis, and Felix Frankfurter and the scholarship of Alexander Bickel.9
Posner also identified its weaknesses; he rightly observed that Thayerians lack
a normative theory for determining when judges should declare a statute (or
executive action) to be unconstitutional.10  And he identified judicial
restraint’s legacy that judges—by invoking Bickel’s passive virtues of stand-
ing, mootness, ripeness, and the political question doctrine—can and do
avoid constitutional questions.11
The Warren Court’s liberal decisions are not the lone cause of death of
judicial restraint.  The development of legal theory also played a role.
Indeed, judicial restraint’s theoretical downfall can be attributed in part to
former Supreme Court clerks who entered the legal academy, clerks includ-
ing Posner himself.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, Warren Court and early Burger Court
clerks entered the legal academy.  They rejected legal process theory that
they had learned in law school from Frankfurter prote´ge´s Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks at Harvard, Alexander Bickel and Harry Wellington at Yale, and
others.  Instead, this new generation of law professors adopted competing
theories and formed their own schools of legal thought.  These new theories
and schools of thought displaced legal process theory and eroded academic
interest in judicial restraint.
My contribution to this panel on the constitutional contributions of the
Warren Court and Burger Court traces the development of legal theory since
the 1960s and argues that Posner and his fellow clerks-turned-academics
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
5 Posner, supra note 1, at 520–21.
6 See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 146 (1893) (quoting In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87, 95
(1834) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
7 Posner, supra note 1, at 522.
8 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER ET AL., JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, AND
FELIX FRANKFURTER ON JOHN MARSHALL 86 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1967).
9 Posner, supra note 1, at 525–32.
10 Id. at 544.
11 Id. at 553 (describing Thayerian judicial restraint’s “legacy” as “limitations on
justiciability”).
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moved the theoretical debate beyond process theory and judicial restraint.
Many, but by no means all, of the important legal theorists of this generation
were former law clerks.12  In order to aid our understanding of this transfor-
mation, I have created a typology that places members of this upstart genera-
tion of law professors into one of five categories:
1. Rights Protectors (Warren Court true believers, rights as trumps, Ely’s
Democracy and Distrust);
2. Post-Realists (Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory, and other
theories that contend that doctrine does not account for judicial
results, law is politics);
3. Law and Economics (liberal and conservative forms);
4. Originalists (which among this group of law clerks was an empty set);
and
5. Judicial Restraint Holdouts.
These five typologies are intended as rough outlines and nonexclusive
categories.  Some, such as law and economics, apply more for private law
than public law (especially constitutional law).  During the course of his or
her career, any single scholar could fall into one of several groups.
Legal process theory—the primary home for Thayerians of the 1950s
and early 1960s—had fallen out of favor by the early-to-mid-1970s.13  The
Warren Court’s most trenchant critics no longer ruled the academic roost.
Instead, a new wave of clerks-turned-academics adopted new theories—rights
protection, post-realism (Critical Legal Studies), law and economics, and
(eventually) originalism—all of which supplanted process theory.  With these
new theories in ascendancy and legal process theory in decline, judicial
restraint yielded to an uninterrupted era of judicial supremacy.
The story, however, does not end there.  Another generation of
Supreme Court clerks, at the end of the Burger Court, became law profes-
sors.  Some came to distrust the Court as a rights protector, believing that the
Justices were nothing more than politicians in robes, and thus rejected judi-
cial supremacy.14  Joined by some older Warren and Burger Court clerks in
the academy, they advanced more democratic theories of judicial review,
including popular constitutionalism.15  Democratic constitutional theory,
advocated by Larry Kramer, Robert Post, Pam Karlan, and others, began to
look a lot like legal process theory of the 1950s and 1960s.16
12 This group includes not only Supreme Court clerks but also lower court clerks.
Dave Trubek, for example, clerked for Second Circuit Judge Charles Clark.  Some impor-
tant legal theorists, such as Roberto Unger, did not clerk at all.  For a list of Supreme Court
clerks according to their respective Justices, see TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MAR-
BLE PALACE app. 4 (2006).
13 See infra notes 96–122 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 143–65 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 143–65 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 143–65 and accompanying text.
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The death of judicial restraint was like an academic popularity contest in
which legal process theory was no longer trendy and hip.  The young cool
kids in the academy, many of them former Warren and Burger Court clerks,
adopted new ideas and transformed legal theory.  Part I explains the ascen-
dancy of legal process theory during the 1950s and early 1960s and its rela-
tionship to judicial restraint.  Part II explores the rejection of legal process
theory by Warren Court and Burger Court clerks who became law professors,
classifies these professors based on five typologies, and explains each typol-
ogy and its leading adherents.  Part III suggests a possible revival of legal
process theory as the last generation of Burger Court clerks joined the acad-
emy and became disenchanted with judicial supremacy.
I. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT’S HOME BASE: LEGAL PROCESS THEORY
  Scholarly advocates for judicial restraint found a home in legal process
theory.  The 1950s and early 1960s were legal process theory’s heyday.
Espoused in different forms by Henry Hart and Al Sacks at Harvard, Alexan-
der Bickel and Harry Wellington at Yale, and Herbert Wechsler at Columbia,
process theory sought “reasoned elaboration” from judges,17 “neutral princi-
ples” from judicial decisions,18 use of “passive virtues” by the Supreme
Court,19 and the understanding of institutional interrelationships among
courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies.  These law professors grap-
pled with the implications of Brown v. Board of Education, criticized the War-
ren Court’s judicial supremacy, and promulgated their ideas in Harvard Law
Review forewords.20  They taught influential courses on the legal process at
Harvard and Yale, courses that emphasized fair and democratic procedures
over results.21  John Henry Schlegel wrote of the up-and-coming Yale law
faculty: “All were various species of legal-process-oriented liberals for whom
Brown v. Board of Education (1954) was rightly decided; McCarthyism was
detested, but anticommunism, essential; and, except for [Dean Eugene] Ros-
tow, the Vietnam War was to be righteously opposed.”22  Above all, process
17 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 145–52 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
18 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
1 (1959).  For a critique of Wechsler’s article, see Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the
1950’s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561 (1988).
19 Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
20 See Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of the Harvard Forewords: A Social
and Intellectual Inquiry, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 463 (1995) (discussing the history and signifi-
cance of the Harvard Law Review forewords).
21 See Charles L. Barzun, The Forgotten Foundations of Hart and Sacks, 99 VA. L. REV. 1,
10–11 (2013); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduc-
tion to The Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at cii–ciii.
22 John Henry Schlegel, Those Weren’t “The Good Old Days,” Just the Old Days: Laura
Kalman on Yale Law School in the Sixties, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 841, 843 (2007) (reviewing
LAURA KALMAN, YALE LAW SCHOOL AND THE SIXTIES (2005)).
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theorists coalesced around fair procedures, the power of reasoned elabora-
tion, and the Court’s limited institutional competence.
The patron saints of legal process theory on the Warren Court were
Felix Frankfurter and John M. Harlan II.  Process theorists extolled Frank-
furter’s and Harlan’s opinions in law review articles.23  To their students at
Harvard, Yale, and elsewhere, process theorists employed Frankfurter and
Harlan as exemplars of how the Court should decide cases.
Frankfurter’s connection to leading process theorists ran deep.  Indeed,
scholars often associate him with process theory.24  It is inaccurate, however,
to attribute the theory to him.  He is best described as “one of the [theory’s]
godparents.”25  He never promulgated process theory the way that Scalia pro-
motes originalism,26 though Frankfurter certainly encouraged his former stu-
dents and law clerks leading the charge.27  Frankfurter’s fingerprints on
process theory were everywhere.  Hart was his star student and co-author;28
Bickel, Sacks, and Wellington were his law clerks;29 and Wechsler was one of
his admirers.  Indeed, Hart and Wechsler dedicated the first edition of The
Federal Courts and Federal System to “Felix Frankfurter who first opened our
minds to these problems.”30  As William Wiecek remarked, “[l]egal [p]rocess
was but Felix Frankfurter writ large.”31  The epicenter of process theory and
Frankfurter worship was Harvard Law School.  At Harvard during the late
1950s, Peter Edelman recalled, “Felix Frankfurter was God.”32
During the 1960s, Frankfurter’s champions, the process theorists, began
to lose the battle of ideas.  Frankfurter retired from the Court in 1962; his
23 See Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38 (1957); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Supreme Court 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959).
24 See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 220, 235 (1995); Eskridge
& Frickey, supra note 21, at civ; LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960, at
49–50 (1986); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Commentary, The Making of The
Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2032–33 (1994); William M. Wiecek, American Juris-
prudence After the War: “Reason Called Law,” 37 TULSA L. REV. 857, 867–72, 874 (2002).
25 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 21, at civ n.234.
26 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 44–47 (1997).
27 See Wiecek, supra note 24, at 871–72.  To former clerks, Frankfurter suggested arti-
cle ideas or commented on their scholarship. See, e.g., Letter from Felix Frankfurter to
Alex Bickel, at 2 (Mar. 18, 1963) (Felix Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School [hereinaf-
ter FFHLS], Box 206, Folder 12, Pt. III, Reel 33); Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Henry
M. Hart, Jr., at 1 (June 29, 1956) (FFHLS, Box 185, Folder 14–15, Pt. III, Reel 16); Letter
from Al Sacks to Felix Frankfurter, at 1–3 (Jan. 7, 1954) (FFHLS, Box 187, Folder 12, Pt.
III, Reel 18).
28 See Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Term, 1934, 49 HARV. L. REV. 68 (1935).
29 See PEPPERS, supra note 12, at app. 4.
30 HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM, at ix (1st ed. 1953).
31 Wiecek, supra note 24, at 874.
32 Peter B. Edelman, Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence and the Good Society: Shades of Felix
Frankfurter and the Harvard Hit Parade of the 1950s, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1799 (1991).
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final opinion, his dissent in Baker v. Carr, warned about the perils of judicial
supremacy.33  Frankfurter’s replacement, Arthur Goldberg, cast the Warren
Court in an even more liberal direction and emboldened it in protecting
rights.  Scholars have identified at least two or even three different Warren
Courts.34  The first began with Brown and ended with Frankfurter’s retire-
ment in 1962; the second began when Arthur Goldberg replaced Frank-
furter; and the third began in 1967 when Thurgood Marshall replaced Tom
Clark.35  During the second and third phases, the protection of rights—civil
rights, voting rights, rights of the accused, and the right to privacy—trumped
emphasis on process.36
The legal academy also changed.  Yale began to challenge Harvard as
the nation’s preeminent law school—at least for “a certain kind of stu-
dent.”37  Yale and Harvard law students rejected the emphasis on fair pro-
cess, reasoned elaboration, neutral principles, and institutional competence
amid the political and social upheaval of the civil rights and antiwar move-
ments.38  As these students entered legal academia in the early 1970s, law
and economics on the right, rights protection on the left, and Critical Legal
Studies on the far left began to supplant process theory.39
33 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“In a demo-
cratic society like ours, relief must come through an aroused popular conscience that sears
the conscience of the people’s representatives.  In any event there is nothing judicially
more unseemly nor more self-defeating than for this Court to make in terrorem pronounce-
ments, to indulge in merely empty rhetoric, sounding a word of promise to the ear, sure to
be disappointing to the hope.”); see Brad Snyder, Frankfurter and Popular Constitutionalism,
47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 346 (2013).
34 See MICHAL R. BELKNAP, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN, 1953–1969, at 80
(2005) (discussing the shift occurring in the Warren Court after the replacement of Justice
Frankfurter with Justice Goldberg); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 11–12 (1998) (positing a three-part Warren Court); LUCAS A. POWE, JR.,
THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 497–99 (2000) (characterizing the Warren
Court as three different courts); Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as History, in THE WARREN
COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 3–4 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993) [hereinaf-
ter THE WARREN COURT] (arguing that the Warren Court did not exist “as a cultural phe-
nomenon” until the early 1960s).
35 See HORWITZ, supra note 34, at 12.
36 See BELKNAP, supra note 34, at 80 (positing that after the replacement of Frankfurter
with Goldberg, “the substantive liberalism espoused by the chief justice, Black, Douglas,
and Brennan vanquished the process liberalism Frankfurter had championed”).
37 KALMAN, supra note 22, at 32; see also id. at 56–57 (noting the characterization and
unique aspects of Yale for particular students in the mid-to-late 1960s).
38 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 21, at cxix–cxxi (describing student critiques of pro-
cess theory by Duncan Kennedy and Roberto Unger).
39 See Barzun, supra note 21, at 8–11 (noting the attack on legal process theory from
the right in the 1970s and 1980s as well as by Critical Legal Studies); Eskridge & Frickey,
supra note 24, at 2051 (“Hart and Sacks’s synthesis was rejected by some of their most
thoughtful students, from both the right . . . and the left.”).
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One other thing contributed to the decline of process theory and judi-
cial restraint: the death of Alexander Bickel.40  If Frankfurter was the god of
process theory, then Bickel was the son (don’t ask me who the holy ghost
was).  Bickel, like Frankfurter, was troubled by the Court’s decision in Baker
v. Carr eviscerating the political question doctrine and introducing an
unworkable arbitrary and capricious standard.41  Bickel, like Frankfurter,
placed great faith in the Court as an institution, and Bickel’s early work
emphasized that the Court should zealously guard its legitimacy.42  The
Court legitimized both constitutional and unconstitutional legislation just by
ruling on it.  Thus, the Court should guard its legitimacy and when possible
avoid constitutional questions.  Bickel’s passive virtues captured Brandeis’s
and Frankfurter’s reliance on constitutional avoidance canons,43 and Bickel’s
countermajoritarian difficulty emphasized the Court’s tenuous position and
limited institutional competence in a democratic system.44  He was a consti-
tutional law giant whose impact at Yale matched Frankfurter’s at Harvard.45
A Romanian-Jewish immigrant to the United States at age fourteen, Bickel
understood Frankfurter’s patriotism and emphasis on order and rule of law.
Bickel was a political liberal who supported Robert Kennedy’s presidential
bid yet reviled the New Left’s campus demonstrations during the late 1960s
and early 1970s, who thought the Warren Court had gone too far in protect-
ing individual rights yet defended The New York Times in the Pentagon Papers
case.46  Bickel’s later scholarship criticized the Warren Court’s excesses.47
His passive virtues are judicial restraint’s most enduring legacy.
40 See Posner, supra note 1, at 533 (“With Bickel’s death in 1974, the main Thayerian
tradition comes to an end.”).
41 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 175–98 (1965); ALEXAN-
DER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 193–97 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter BICKEL,
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH].
42 See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 41, at 25–26 (arguing that “insula-
tion and the marvelous mystery of time give courts the capacity to appeal to men’s better
natures”); see id. at 29–31, 71–72, 129 (discussing the Court’s legitimating function).
43 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 17
(1957) (quoting Brandeis that the “‘most important thing we do is not doing’”); BICKEL,
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 41, at 111–98; Bickel, supra note 19, at 41.  Nonethe-
less, Brandeis did not always avoid constitutional questions. See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938); Willing v. Chi. Auditorium Ass’n, 277 U.S. 274 (1928).
44 BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 41, at 16–23.
45 See KALMAN, supra note 22, at 52; Robert A. Burt, Alex Bickel’s Law School and Ours,
104 YALE L.J. 1853, 1856 (1995) (stating that Bickel’s “distinctive vision framed the terms of
debate in constitutional jurisprudence in the 1960’s and beyond”); Edward A. Purcell, Jr.,
Alexander M. Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 521, 521
(1976) (“While Alexander Bickel’s premature death at the age of forty-nine was a personal
tragedy for his family and friends, it was an intellectual loss of almost equal proportion for
his wide and varied audience.”).
46 KALMAN, supra note 22, at 52–54, 208–09, 214–15.  For Bickel’s decision to represent
The New York Times and initial views on the case, see DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE
PRESSES STOPPED 101–04 (1996).
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During the late 1960s Bickel clashed with his students, several of whom
became leading members of the legal academy.48  In 1974, Bickel died at age
forty-nine of cancer.  By the mid-1970s, his former students and their theories
were in ascendancy.  No process theorist stepped up to challenge them.  Hart
had died in 1969 after several years of declining health.49  Al Sacks suffered
“severe health problems” during the late 1970s and 1980s and served as dean
of Harvard Law School, both of which slowed his scholarly efforts.50  Yet
Bickel’s death was the one that robbed process theory and judicial restraint
of its standard-bearer and most eloquent spokesman.
II. FIVE TYPES OF WARREN COURT AND EARLY BURGER COURT CLERKS
IN THE ACADEMY
  Legal theory played a key role in the decline of Thayerian judicial restraint.
The Warren Court’s critics in the legal academy—the process theorists—saw
their theories fall out of favor.  Instead, Warren Court and early Burger
Court clerks became law professors and advanced theories that made process
theory passe´.
This Part seeks to identify the Warren Court and early Burger Court
clerks in the academy and to understand their theoretical opposition (or sup-
port for) judicial restraint.  To do so, it places these legal academics into one
of five categories: (1) Rights Protectors; (2) Post-Realists/Critical Legal Stud-
ies (CLS); (3) Law and Economics; (4) Originalists; and (5) Judicial Restraint
Holdouts.  This typology explains what each of these schools of thought
stood for, who their leaders were, which Justices they clerked for, and how
these upstart law professors contributed to judicial restraint’s demise.
The categories are broad, overlapping, and in some instances inade-
quate.  It is impossible to account for every Warren Court and early Burger
Court clerk who became a law professor.  Nor is it possible to capture all the
nuances of complex legal theories in thumbnail sketches.  Typology, how-
ever, has its place.  Inspired by Roscoe Pound’s sociological jurisprudence
and Philip Bobbitt’s modalities of constitutional interpretation (and with
apologies to Pound and Bobbitt for putting their ideas in the same breath as
mine), I have identified academics and their theories with one of five schools
of thought in order to present a more complex portrait about who or what
killed the theory of judicial restraint.
47 For Bickel’s criticism of the Warren Court, see generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA
OF PROGRESS (1970).
48 KALMAN, supra note 22, at 155, 287 (discussing Duncan Kennedy’s “radicaliz[ing]”
experiences at Yale, his interactions with Bickel, and Bickel’s relief that Kennedy did not
accept Yale’s offer to join the faculty).
49 For the best chapter on Hart, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PRO-
GRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 258–85 (2000); see also id. at 390 n.195 (discussing Hart’s declining
health).
50 HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at xcvii.
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A. Rights Protectors
Category 1: Rights Protectors
Intellectual leader: John Hart Ely (Warren OT 1965)51
Inspirations: Carolene Products Footnote Four
Patron Saints: Justice Brennan, Chief Justice Warren, John Rawls
Charter Members: John Hart Ely, Ronald Dworkin, Owen Fiss, Frank
Michelman, Laurence Tribe
Purpose: To justify the Warren Court’s liberal decisions
Category 1 (Rights Protectors) is the broadest of the five categories.
Many liberal professors entered the legal academy after clerking on the War-
ren Court and early Burger Court.  These young academics believed in the
Court’s mission of protecting civil rights and civil liberties.  They placed their
faith in the judiciary as the most effective branch when it came to safeguard-
ing the legal rights and remedies of the less fortunate.  They gravitated to
theories that defended the Warren Court’s liberal decisions and the role of
the Court as a rights protector.  They were not troubled by Bickel’s counter-
majoritarian difficulty and embraced the Court’s role as standing up for the
little guy.  Laura Kalman has referred to this category as “legal liberalism.”52
A less flattering label is Warren Court preservationism.  As Kalman wrote,
“Calabresi, Ely, and other legal liberals of all ages operate in a twilight zone
where Earl Warren receives artificial life support.”53
This category encompasses numerous liberal academics and their theo-
ries.  Some of them believed in their patron saint Justice Brennan’s approach
that rights are trumps—that rights trumped the power of the federal govern-
ment and especially the power of state governments to abridge minority
rights.  Viewed by many as the chief tactician of the Warren Court’s civil
rights and civil liberties revolution,54 Brennan inspired fierce loyalty among
many of his former clerks who entered the academy and who theorized about
ways to justify the Court’s rights-protecting role.
Owen Fiss (Brennan OT 1964) is considered a paradigmatic Warren
Court preservationist and rights protector.  Fiss believed that American con-
51 This Article identifies clerks by the terms in which they served.  OT means October
Term.
52 LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 2 (1996) (“[Legal liber-
alism refers to] trust in the potential of courts, particularly the Supreme Court, to bring
about ‘those specific social reforms that affect large groups of people such as blacks, or
workers, or women, or partisans of a particular persuasion; in other words, policy change
with nationwide impact.’ Because of the nation’s experience with the Warren Court, legal
liberalism has been linked to political liberalism since midcentury.” (quoting GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 4 (1991))).
53 Id. at 8.
54 Robert C. Post, William J. Brennan and the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT,
supra note 34, at 123 (quoting Hutchinson that Brennan was “responsible” for the Warren
Court’s “intellectual legacy”); POWE, supra note 34, at 499 (noting that Dennis Hutchinson,
Sanford Levinson, and Robert Post credited Brennan with the Warren Court’s leadership).
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stitutional law began in 1954 with Brown v. Board of Education55 and that eve-
rything after 1969 was a retrenchment on the Warren Court’s “program of
constitutional reform,” which was “almost revolutionary in its aspiration and,
now and then, in its achievements.”56  Fiss’s early scholarship on injunctions
emphasized the Court’s role not only as rights protector but also as remedy
enforcer.  Contesting the progressive idea that injunctions should be an
extraordinary remedy (particularly in the labor context), Fiss argued in favor
of structural injunctions in light of “the triumph of Brown and the civil rights
injunction[s].”57
Like Fiss, Frank Michelman (Brennan OT 1961) is another intellectual
leader of the rights protectors.  Building on John Rawls’s theory of distribu-
tive justice, Michelman believed that rights protection extended not only to
race but also to class.58  In a groundbreaking 1969 Harvard Law Review fore-
word, he articulated a minimum theory of equal protection that urged the
Court to use the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the poor.59
Michelman’s theory, if adopted by the Court, would have resulted in a differ-
ent outcome in cases such as San Antonio v. Rodriguez, which upheld Texas’s
system of financing public education through property taxes even though the
system resulted in wide economic disparities among its public school
systems.60
Michelman continued to advance a Rawlsian theory that the courts
should protect the poor—particularly when it came to welfare rights.61  The
Court gave support to his theory with Goldberg v. Kelly,62 which held that wel-
fare benefits could not be revoked without procedural due process.63
Goldberg v. Kelly was a fundamental case about the proper role of the Court in
the eyes of rights protectors such as Fiss, Michelman, and Charles Reich
(Black OT 1953).64  Indeed, Fiss taught generations of Yale law students civil
55 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
56 Owen Fiss, A Life Lived Twice, 100 YALE L.J. 1117, 1118 (1991).
57 OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 6 (1978).
58 See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 14–15 (1969) (building on
Rawls’s theory of “justice as fairness” and the identification of “just wants”).
59 Id. at 14–15 & n.20. See generally Frank I. Michelman, The Priority of Liberty: Rawls and
“Tiers of Scrutiny” (Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 11-22, 2011), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1927292 (discussing “Rawlsian political
liberalism”).
60 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
61 See Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls’
Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 1016 (1973) (discussing Rawls’s “comprehensive,
coherent theory of social justice”).
62 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
63 Id. at 261.
64 Id. at 262 n.8 (quoting Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965)) (citing Charles A. Reich, The New
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964)); see also Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK.
L. REV. 789, 789 (1990) (describing Goldberg’s outcome as “singular” and “remarkable” and
attributing it to Brennan’s jurisprudential triumphs during the 1960s); Charles A. Reich,
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procedure through the lens of Goldberg v. Kelly and its progeny.65  For Fiss,
“Procedure,” as he referred to his legendary course, means not the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure but the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause and the Court’s ability to use it to protect the less fortunate.66
The primus inter pares among the intellectual leaders of the rights protec-
tors was John Hart Ely (Warren OT 1963).67  As a Yale law student, he was a
standout pupil of Bickel’s.  As a summer associate at Arnold, Porter & Fortas,
he assisted partners Abe Fortas and Abe Krash in preparing the briefs for
Fortas’s oral argument in Gideon v. Wainwright.68  Ely’s clerkship with Chief
Justice Warren turned him into a lifelong defender of Warren and his
Court.69  Ely dedicated his most important book, Democracy and Distrust, to
Warren and wrote: “You don’t need many heroes if you choose carefully.”70
Democracy and Distrust borrowed heavily from process theory, blunted
Bickel’s Warren Court criticism, and answered Bickel’s countermajoritarian
difficulty.71  The Court was not countermajoritarian; judicial review was not a
“deviant institution in the American democracy.”72  The Court’s role, accord-
ing to Ely, was not to trump the democratic political process but to improve
it.  Instead of inviting judges to impose their fundamental values on the
country, Ely advocated “a participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing
approach to judicial review.”73  Ely’s theory justified the Court’s intervention
in Brown v. Board of Education74 as well as Baker v. Carr75 and subsequent
voting rights cases.76  He disagreed with Roe v. Wade77 because it second-
Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 731, 731 (1990)
(describing Goldberg as “a landmark in the evolution of social justice”).
65 See OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 54–130
(2003).
66 Fiss’s retirement speech in his last civil procedure class made students cry. See M.L.,
A Professor’s Reach, YALE L. SCH. (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.law.yale.edu/admissions/128
27.htm.
67 As of 2000, Ely was the fourth most-cited legal scholar behind Posner, Dworkin, and
Holmes.  Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 424 tbl.6
(2000).
68 ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 122–26 (1964).
69 John Hart Ely, The Chief, 88 HARV. L. REV. 11, 11 (1974) (“He was a leader because
he was a man with a mission, and because the mission was good.”); see id. (describing
Warren as “one of the greatest single forces for right the nation has ever known”).
70 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, at v (1980).
71 Id. at 69–72 (discussing Bickel’s later work and Warren Court criticism); see also
Harry H. Wellington, Foreword to BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 41, at x
(arguing Ely “in one way or another is a student of Bickel” and that his scholarship would
not have been possible without The Least Dangerous Branch).
72 BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 41, at 18.  For Bickel’s discussion of
the countermajoritarian difficulty, see id. at 16–28.
73 ELY, supra note 70, at 87; see id. at 87–104.
74 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
75 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
76 ELY, supra note 70, at 116–25.
77 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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guessed legislatures, revived the evils of Lochner,78 and lacked a constitutional
principle.79  Ely’s theoretical disagreement with Roe revealed the strong influ-
ence of legal process theory on Democracy and Distrust.  Yet Ely also rejected
the prior generation’s emphasis on neutral principles, the Court’s limited
institutional competence, and safeguarding the Court’s legitimacy.  He later
wrote: “What it was about Felix Frankfurter that supposedly ‘fooled’ Franklin
Roosevelt was the ‘legal process’ joker, the assumption that there are times
when one may strongly disapprove of a law without being prepared to declare
it unconstitutional.”80
Ely’s theory of judicial review was not new.  It justified the Warren
Court’s jurisprudence by borrowing from process theory as well as from foot-
note four of Carolene Products, which called for a “more ‘exacting’ judicial
scrutiny” for legislation that interfered with the democratic political pro-
cess.81  The text of Harlan Fiske Stone’s opinion suggested the Court should
take a deferential approach in reviewing economic legislation.  But his
famous footnote argued that legislation that violates “a specific prohibition of
the Constitution” including the “first ten amendments,” that “restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation,” or that prejudices “discrete and insular minorities”
should be subject to “a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”82
The power of Ely’s book was its common sense approach to a previous
generation’s post-Brown and post-Baker anxiety about the scope of judicial
review, the debate about whether judges should impose their fundamental
values, and whether we would become a government by judiciary.  It rejected
Bickel’s concern with the countermajoritarian difficulty and the Court’s legit-
imating function and Wechsler’s concern with neutral principles.  It spoke
for a new generation of academics intent on defending the liberal decisions
of the Warren Court and on protecting rights of those who needed protect-
ing—either because they were “discrete and insular minorities” or because of
defects in the political process or both.
In addition to Ely, others answered Bickel’s concern about the counter-
majoritarian difficulty and his criticism of the Warren Court’s perceived
excesses in Baker v. Carr and other cases.  Though more of a process theorist
than a rights protector, Gerald Gunther (Warren OT 1954) mocked Bickel’s
passive virtues for praising the Court’s intervention in Brown and its avoid-
78 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
79 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
926, 937–43, 948–49 (1973).
80 John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where
Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 865–66 (1991).  Ely noted: “I’m
not sure this account is correct.” Id. at 866 n.102.
81 ELY, supra note 70, at 76–78 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938)) (citing Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944)).
82 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted); see also David M. Bixby, The
Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights: Another Look at United States v. Clas-
sic, 90 YALE L.J. 741, 745 (1981) (identifying footnote four’s influence on the Roosevelt
Court’s anti-totalitarian theory of the Constitution).
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ance of a 1955 interracial marriage case Naim v. Naim,83 but criticizing its
decision in Baker—as “the 100% insistence on principle, 20% of the time.”84
Near the end of his illustrious career and after thirty years of work on the
project, Gunther published a biography of Judge Learned Hand, one of the
leading lower court judges and practitioners of judicial restraint.85  Instead
of emphasizing Hand’s judicial restraint, his criticism of Brown and judicial
review (the former conveniently blamed on Frankfurter),86 or Hand’s inspi-
ration for the law and economics movement in Carroll Towing87 (which Pos-
ner pointed out was not even mentioned in the biography), Gunther turned
Hand into a civil libertarian and constitutional law scholar.88  In other words,
Gunther turned Hand into Gunther.  The Hand biography became another
argument for protection of civil rights and civil liberties.
This far-from-exhaustive discussion of the rights protectors category can-
not be complete without mentioning Laurence Tribe (Stewart OT 1967).
Immediately after his clerkship, Tribe joined the Harvard law faculty and
established himself as one of constitutional law’s leading liberal voices.  In
1978, he published the first edition of his highly influential treatise, American
Constitutional Law.89  Tribe’s treatise made no secret of its preference for the
Court’s protection of civil rights and civil liberties and its distaste for legal
process theory, passive virtues, or judicial restraint.  In the preface to his first
edition, he wrote: “Though I express occasional reservations about judicial
initiative in specific settings, I reject the assumptions characteristic of Justices
like Felix Frankfurter and scholars like Alexander Bickel: the highest mission
of the Supreme Court, in my view, is not to conserve judicial credibil-
ity . . . .”90  Tribe wrote in his 1978 preface: “I perceive in recent decisions of
the Supreme Court a distressing retreat from an appropriate defense of lib-
erty and equality.”91  Seven years later, he argued and lost a challenge to
Georgia’s anti-sodomy law in Bowers v. Hardwick.92
83 Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891, 891 (1955) (mem.) (per curiam), appeal denied, 350
U.S. 985 (1956) (mem.) (per curiam).
84 Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1964).
85 GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND (2d ed. 2011).
86 Id. at 572–79.
87 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (laying out the
so-called “Hand Formula” where the burden of precaution required is a function of the
probability and the gravity of injury).
88 Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial Greatness,
104 YALE L.J. 511, 514–15 (1994) (reviewing GUNTHER, supra note 85); see id. at 513–20
(contrasting Hand’s opinions in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917),
rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917) with United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950),
aff’d, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)).  Posner concluded: “I would rate Hand’s contribution to con-
stitutional thought slight.” Id. at 520.
89 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978).
90 Id. at iv.
91 Id. at v.
92 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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Led by Fiss, Michelman, Ely, and Tribe, rights protectors embraced theo-
ries that sought to preserve the liberal decisions of the Warren Court and to
justify the Court’s interventionist role to protect the civil rights and civil liber-
ties of social outcasts, racial and religious minorities, and the poor.  They
looked to Rawls’s Theory of Justice,93 footnote four of Carolene Products,94 and
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.95
And they rejected concerns about the Court’s legitimacy and countermajori-
tarian difficulty and rebuffed the use of passive virtues.  Even if judicial review
is antidemocratic, rights protectors believed that by protecting rights the
judiciary made American democracy a more just and fair form of
government.
B. Post-Realists
Category 2: Post-Realists (Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory,
etc.)
Intellectual leaders: Duncan Kennedy (Stewart OT 1970), Roberto
Unger
Inspirations: Legal Realism, Deconstruction, Marxism
Patron Saints: William O. Douglas, Karl Marx, Max Weber
Charter Members: Peter Gabel, Robert Gordon, Morton Horwitz, Mark
Kelman, Karl Klare, John Henry Schlegel, David Trubek, Mark
Tushnet (Marshall OT 1972)
Purpose: To demystify doctrine and the rule of law as indeterminate (the
indeterminacy thesis) and critique legal liberalism from the left
The New Left entered law school at the height of the black power and
antiwar movements.  Yale had eclipsed Harvard as the law school for the radi-
cal left.  During the 1970 May Day demonstrations over the murder trial of
Bobby Seale, New Haven was the epicenter of student activism.  Some law
students (including Hillary Rodham Clinton) attended Seale’s trial as observ-
ers.  Other more radical students clashed with the faculty and administration.
They lacked faith in institutions and could cite numerous examples as to
why—the murders of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Bobby Kennedy, the
election of Richard Nixon, the Kent State shootings, FBI wiretapping of radi-
cals, and the Vietnam War and bombing of Cambodia.  The lack of faith in
institutions extended to the Supreme Court.  Radical law students challenged
both their professors’ belief in legal process theory as well as the Warren
Court’s legal liberalism.  Nonetheless, some of these students excelled in law
school, clerked on the early Burger Court, and entered the legal academy.
New Left academics formed schools of thought that I have labeled post-
realist in an effort to capture not only Critical Legal Studies (CLS) but also
93 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).
94 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
95 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Feminist Legal Theory (FLT).96  Post-realists
deconstructed legal doctrine.  They believed that doctrine did not account
for judicial results, and legal rules were indeterminate—the “indeterminacy
thesis.”97  The rule of law—in private law categories such as torts, contracts,
and property as well as public law—was merely a cover for political judg-
ments and policy preferences.  As Mark Tushnet observed, “the proposition
common to most [CLS] authors [is] that law is politics.”98  Borrowing from
legal realism of the 1920s and 1930s, deconstructionist literary theory, the law
and society movement, and the “false consciousness” of Marxist theory, the
post-realists attacked process theory and rights protection.  The choice
between the democratic political process and the judicial protection of civil
rights and civil liberties was a false one.  Both theories failed because of their
faith in the rule of law and because of the indeterminacy of rules.
One of the leading post-realists was Duncan Kennedy.  As a Yale law stu-
dent, Kennedy clashed with Bickel and other process theorists.99  As a young
Harvard law professor, Kennedy started Critical Legal Studies with David
Trubek, his first-year property professor who had been purged from Yale in
1972 and landed at Wisconsin.100  Kennedy and Trubek recruited other New
Left professors including Tushnet and John Henry Schlegel as well as fellow
travelers from the law and society movement.101  In the spring of 1977, they
96 Tensions among CLS, CRT, and FLT existed from the beginning.  CLS’s
indeterminancy thesis clashed with some of CRT’s and FLT’s emphasis on rights. See Mark
Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1520 (1991) (“[S]ome
feminist and minority scholars who share the [CLS] political location have disagreed with
some formulations of the indeterminacy thesis, and in particular with the use of that thesis
to challenge the importance of the vindication of rights, especially constitutional rights.”).
Others associated with CRT, including Derrick Bell, echoed CLS’s skepticism.  Derrick A.
Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litiga-
tion, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
97 Compare Mark Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 339,
339 (1996) (proposing an indeterminacy thesis that is not vulnerable to the criticisms
lodged against the original version), with Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy,
Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 558–59 (1993) (arguing that claims pre-
mised on the “indeterminacy thesis” are unpersuasive), and Lawrence B. Solum, On the
Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 462–63 (1987) (offer-
ing a critique of the indeterminacy thesis).
98 Tushnet, supra note 96, at 1517.
99 See supra note 48.
100 John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of
the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391, 392–93 (1984).
101 Id. at 395–96.
Kennedy is a cross between Rasputin and Billy Graham.  Machiavellian, and with a
gift for blarney that would make the stone get up, walk over, and kiss him, he can
work an audience or an individual with the seductiveness of a revivalist preacher,
for Kennedy wants your soul.  Trubek, on the other hand, the self-described
leader of the Radical Yale Law School in Exile “Mafia,” is more like a cross
between Lloyd Cutler and Rabbi Ben Ezra.  Enormously skilled at bureaucratic
maneuvering (he has almost singlehandedly kept the soft money heat pump flow-
ing at Wisconsin for several years now) and a naturally diplomatic conciliator of
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held the first of two CLS conferences at the University of Wisconsin Law
School.  Kennedy published articles about private law doctrines in contracts
and torts to reveal the contradictions inherent in the choice between formal
legal rules and standards.102  As law students, Kennedy and the other high
priest of CLS, Roberto Unger, had written unpublished essays attacking the
Hart and Sacks materials.103  Kennedy, Unger, and other CLS scholars also
exposed the “vacuity of the discourse” about rights.104  A “false conscious-
ness” in the logic and efficacy of rules (classical legal thought) was just as bad
as “false consciousness” about the efficacy of protecting rights.105
There was only one problem with post-realism.  Once CLS had decon-
structed everything—private law, public law, doctrine, rights protection—
they lacked a theory to replace the ones that they had deconstructed.  They
couldn’t answer the question: “[W]hat would you put in its place?”106  Other
academics, some of whom had clerked on the Warren and early Burger
Courts, were equally dissatisfied with process theory yet came up with theo-
ries of their own.
C. Law and Economics
Category 3: Law and Economics
Intellectual leaders: Richard Posner (Brennan OT 1963)
Inspirations: Learned Hand’s Carroll Towing
Patron Saints: Ronald Coase, Guido Calabresi (Black OT 1958)
Charter Members: Richard Posner, Guido Calabresi, Gary Becker, Henry
Manne, A. Mitchell Polinsky
Purpose: To inform legal decision-making based on cost-benefit analysis
and economic efficiency
If post-realists attacked legal process theory from the left, then the law
and economics movement supplanted it from the right.  The president of the
1961–1962 Harvard Law Review was Richard Posner.  During the 1950s,
no mean talents, he makes and maintains alliances with consummate ease.  One
need not, however, defend one’s soul against Trubek’s onslaught; he mostly wants
your support.
Id. at 392 (footnote omitted).
102 See generally Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort
Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV.
563 (1982); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685 (1976); see also MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15–63 (1987)
(critiquing the debate about rules and standards).
103 See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also KELMAN, supra note 102, at
187–212 (discussing CLS’s critique of process theory).
104 Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 39 (1984).
105 Id. at 40–44.
106 Richard Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 779, 780 (1992) (reviewing KELMAN, supra note 102). But see John Henry Schlegel,
CLS Wasn’t Killed by a Question, 58 ALA. L. REV. 967, 968 (2007) (“CLS wasn’t killed by a
question; it simply drifted out of fashion for want of a ‘new look.’”).
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Frankfurter had first dibs on the law review’s best and brightest.  But by 1962,
Frankfurter had retired, and Harvard’s top students clerked for Brennan—
including Posner.107  For two years after his Brennan clerkship, Posner
worked for one of Frankfurter’s former clerks and prote´ge´s, Federal Trade
Commissioner Philip Elman.108  In just three short years, Posner had been
exposed to the inner sanctums of legal liberalism and legal process.  He
charted a third course—law and economics.
Law and economics did not begin with Richard Posner.  As he conceded,
he was standing on the shoulders of economist Ronald Coase and Yale law
professor Guido Calabresi.109  Coase’s 1960 article The Problem of Social Cost
and Calabresi’s Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts a year
later started the movement.110  Coase introduced economic efficiency, trans-
action costs, positive and negative externalities, and marginal economic the-
ory into the legal lexicon.111  The Coase theorem posited that, in the absence
of transaction costs, parties could achieve efficient outcomes by contracting
around externalities regardless of the initial distribution of property.112
Transaction costs, however, were rarely so low.113  Calabresi applied similar
ideas about economic efficiency to tort law, specifically to the cost of
accidents.114
Posner popularized law and economics—by writing about antitrust law,
by extending economic analysis to many types of legal questions in the first
edition of his groundbreaking book Economic Analysis of Law in 1973, and by
becoming one of the most prolific scholars of last forty years.115  Law and
107 Richard A. Posner, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 9, 9
(1997) [hereinafter Posner, In Memoriam]; Richard A. Posner, A Tribute to Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 13, 13 (1990).
108 Interview, A Conversation with Judge Richard A. Posner, 58 DUKE L.J. 1807, 1812 (2009)
(describing Elman as “a former boss of mine whom I greatly respected”); Richard A. Pos-
ner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 761, 761–62 (2005)
(discussing Elman).
109 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 4 (1981) (describing them as
“pioneers”).
110 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Guido Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).  For a discussion
of Calabresi’s role in developing the ideas in the Coase Theorem, see Alain Marciano,
Calabresi, “Law and Economics” and the Coase Theorem (Int’l Ctr. for Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 26/2010, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1710608.
111 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics,
86 IND. L.J. 499, 541–42 (2011).
112 Coase, supra note 110, at 10.
113 Id. at 15 (describing it as a “very unrealistic assumption”).
114 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). See generally Keith N. Hylton,
Calabresi and the Intellectual History of Law and Economics, 64 MD. L. REV. 85 (2005) (discuss-
ing Calabresi’s book, as well as exploring its influences and impact on current
scholarship).
115 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1–8 (1973).  He is the most cited
legal scholar of all time. See Charles K. Rowley, An Intellectual History of Law and Economics:
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economics has developed in numerous ways.  It can be positive or normative,
liberal or conservative.  Indeed, Calabresi, a leading Warren Court preserva-
tionist and rights protector, argued that efficiency considerations should be
balanced against moral ones as well as against institutional competence.116
In recent years, left-of-center legal scholars including Cass Sunstein (Marshall
OT 1979) have focused on behavioral economics.117
The post-realists, particularly CLS and the law and society movement,
relentlessly critiqued law and economics.  Duncan Kennedy wrote that the
idea that judges should decide among possible legal rules based on Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency (with the better off party compensating the worse off) is “a
bad idea, practically unworkable, incoherent on its own terms, and just as
open to alternating liberal and conservative ideological manipulation as the
open-ended policy analysis it was supposed to replace.”118  And yet Kennedy’s
biography lists “Left Wing Law and Economics” among his specialties.119
Law and economics is a big tent indeed.
With CLS applying its indeterminacy thesis to law and economics and
law and society preferring qualitative methodologies to quantitative ones, no
one in the legal academy was talking about process theory anymore.  With
the post-realists led by Kennedy and law and economists led by Posner jockey-
ing for position in the intellectual pecking order, process theory was no
longer relevant to the contemporary scholarly debate.
The law and economics debate took place mostly in torts, contracts,
property, criminal law, and administrative law and regulation.  Unlike post-
realism, law and economics applied more to private law than public law and
had little to say about constitutional theory or a general theory of judging.
Posner, the leading law and economist, has critiqued Ely’s Democracy and Dis-
trust and what Posner contends is the general failure of constitutional the-
ory.120  When it comes to judging, Posner has aligned himself with legal
pragmatists who fit doctrine around consequences.121  Not surprisingly, Pos-
1739–2003, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 3, 20 (Francesco Parisi & Charles K.
Rowley eds., 2005) (describing Posner as “unequivocally” the “most important scholar in
law and economics” since he published Economic Analysis of Law); supra note 67.
116 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1972).
117 See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008).
118 Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in 2
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465, 465 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998); see also KELMAN, supra note 102, at 151–85 (discussing Kennedy’s and Michelman’s
critiques of the conservative preferences in law and economics).
119 Duncan M. Kennedy, HARV. L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/
10469/Kennedy (last visited Apr. 12, 2014).
120 RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 198–214 (1995).
121 Posner, supra note 1, at 539; see id. 539–42; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS
ON JUDGING 5 (2013) (“I am a pragmatic judge . . . .”); id. at 5–6 (linking pragmatism with
legal realism); RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 230–65 (2008) (“The word that best
describes the average American judge at all levels of our judicial hierarchies and yields the
greatest insight into his behavior is ‘pragmatist’ . . . .”); see id. at 230–65; RICHARD A. POS-
NER, CARDOZO 28 (1990) (“Cardozo’s extrajudicial writings constitute in fact the fullest
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ner argues that “[m]any of the most highly regarded judges and Justices in
American legal history” have been pragmatists.122  But when it comes to




Intellectual Leaders: Ed Meese, Antonin Scalia
Inspirations: Hugo Black
Patron Saints: James Madison
Charter Members: None from this generation of Warren Court/Burger
Court clerks; Robert Bork, Antonin Scalia
Purpose: To limit constitutional decision making to the original intent
of the Framers and the original meaning of the text
In a July 1985 speech to the American Bar Association, Attorney General
Ed Meese attacked liberal decisions of the Warren Court and Burger Court
and feared that “a drift back toward the radical egalitarianism and expansive
civil libertarianism of the Warren Court would once again be a threat to the
notion of limited but energetic government.”123  Instead of interpreting the
Constitution based on a judge’s policy preferences, Meese advocated a differ-
ent approach: “The text of the document and the original intention of those
who framed it would be the judicial standard in giving effect to the Constitu-
tion.”124  Meese’s speech declared originalism to be the official policy of the
Reagan Administration:
It has been and will continue to be the policy of this administration to
press for a Jurisprudence of Original Intention.  In the cases we file and
those we join as amicus, we will endeavor to resurrect the original meaning
of constitutional provisions and statutes as the only reliable guide for
judgment.125
Meese’s theory wasn’t new, either.  Hugo Black could be considered the
twentieth century’s “most successful originalist” for taking a textualist
statement of a jurisprudence of pragmatism that we possess . . . . Cardozo’s formulation was
not only more fully developed but also clearer, more explicit, and more coherent [than
Holmes’s].” (footnote omitted)).
122 Posner, supra note 1, at 542; see id. at 540 (noting that prominent pragmatists
included John Marshall, Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, Robert Jackson, Learned Hand,
Roger Traynor, and Henry Friendly).
123 Edwin Meese III, The Great Debate: Attorney General Ed Meese III, FEDERALIST SOC’Y
(July 9, 1985), http://www.fed-soc.org/resources/page/the-great-debate-attorney-general-
ed-meese-iii-july-9-1985.
124 Id.
125 Id.; see Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2009)
(positing that originalism was an instrument of the Reagan Administration to put its cri-
tique of the Warren and Burger Courts in “jurisprudential terms,” and that Ed Meese insti-
tuted a campaign to publicly promote this idea).
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approach to the Constitution, a theory then-described as interpretivism.126
In attempting to incorporate the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause, Black relied on the original intent of the Framers
of the Reconstruction Amendments.127  Black, not Brennan, is often consid-
ered the “intellectual leader” of the Warren Court.128
Originalism, as conceived by Meese and adopted by the Reagan Adminis-
tration, promoted different types of jurists than Hugo Black.  Less than a year
after Meese’s ABA speech, Reagan nominated D.C. Circuit Judge (and for-
mer law professor) Antonin Scalia to the Supreme Court.  With almost no
fanfare because of liberal opposition to Rehnquist’s elevation to Chief Jus-
tice, the 50-year-old Scalia was confirmed 98 to 0.129  Reagan’s next Supreme
Court nominee, Robert Bork, was not so fortunate.  Bork established his aca-
demic reputation at Yale as one of the nation’s foremost antitrust scholars
and dabbled in constitutional law by writing about neutral principles.130
Bork’s attempts to defend originalism during his 1987 Supreme Court confir-
mation hearings resulted in his rejection by the U.S. Senate by a 58-to-42
vote.131  From Meese’s speech to Scalia’s nomination to Bork’s hearings,
originalism was born.  Originalism’s rise was aided by the founding of the
Federalist Society, which was started in 1982 by conservative and libertarian
law students at Yale, Harvard, and Chicago and has grown into a national
home for the conservative legal movement and for many originalists.132
126 David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 969, 975 (2008) (describing Black as “the most successful originalist of the last cen-
tury” and as using it “to attack what was, in his view, a corrupt tradition . . . of the pre-New
Deal Court”); see also David A. Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and Judicial Restraint, 34
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 143 (2011) (describing Black and Scalia as the “two most
prominent originalists of the last hundred years”).
127 ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK 349–60 (2d ed. 1997); see Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, app. at 92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 866 (1960).
128 Akhil Reed Amar, 2000 Daniel J. Meador Lecture: Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53
ALA. L. REV. 1221, 1242 (2002) (“[A] forceful case can be made for Hugo Black as the true
intellectual leader—the most valuable player—of the Warren Court.”); Roger K. Newman,
The Warren Court and American Politics: An Impressionistic Appreciation, 18 CONST. COMMENT.
661, 696 (2001) (reviewing POWE, supra note 34) (citing mid-1960s commentators dubbing
Black the Warren Court’s intellectual leader); Posner, In Memoriam, supra note 107, at 11
(“Brennan was not the ‘intellectual leader’ of the ‘Warren Court.’  The intellectual leader,
if there was one, was Black . . . .”).
129 See 132 CONG. REC. 23,813 (1986).
130 For examples of Bork’s work, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978),
and Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971).
131 See 133 CONG. REC. 29,121 (1987).
132 See STEPHEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 135–80
(2008); Our Background, FEDERALIST SOC’Y, http://www.fed-soc.org/aboutus/id.28/default
.asp (last visited Apr. 8, 2014) (“We are committed to the principles that the state exists to
preserve freedom, that the separation of governmental powers is central to our Constitu-
tion, and that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is,
not what it should be.”).
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Today originalism is the dominant method of constitutional interpreta-
tion, started by the right and adopted by the left.  The starting point for most
academic debates about constitutional interpretation is whether one is for or
against originalism.  Yet among Warren Court and early Burger Court clerks
who became law professors, originalism is a null set.  Why didn’t originalism
have any takers among this group?  One reason is timing—they entered the
academy before 1985 and adopted other theories.  Another reason is that
most of the Warren Court and early Burger Court clerks were liberal, and the
legal academy that they joined was even more liberal.  For liberal clerks
entering the liberal academy, originalism did not have any appeal.  Indeed, it
would be years before some liberal law professors abandoned rights protec-
tion and post-realism and declared themselves originalists.133  Despite these
recent liberal converts, originalism remains the primary intellectual stomp-
ing ground for libertarians and conservatives.
Even though Warren Court and early Burger Court clerks-turned-profes-
sors did not adopt Meese’s preferred theory, originalism marginalized legal
process theory and judicial restraint.  For the right, process theory and judi-
cial restraint lacked any prescriptive or normative insights into how to stem
the tide of liberal Supreme Court decisions.  The right attacked liberal deci-
sions of the Warren and Burger Courts and the rights protectors who
defended them by adopting a normative theory with more populist and intui-
tive appeal.  By interpreting the text of the Constitution according to its origi-
nal meaning or according to the Framers’ original intent, originalists tapped
into America’s obsession with its Founding Fathers and its founding ideals of
freedom and democracy.  Process theory and judicial restraint did not stand
a chance.
E. Judicial Restraint Holdouts
Category 5: Judicial Restraint Holdouts
Intellectual Leader: J. Harvie Wilkinson (Powell OT 1972)
Patron Saints: John M. Harlan II, Henry Friendly, Lewis Powell
Charter Members: Paul Bator (Harlan OT 1956), Jesse Choper (Warren
OT 1960), Charles Fried (Harlan OT 1960)
Purpose: To limit judicial decision making and avoid constitutional
questions out of respect for and belief in the democratic political
process
This group of Warren Court and early Burger Court clerks/academics is
larger than the null set among the originalists, but not by much.  For the
same reasons that the clerks were not drawn to originalism, they were not
drawn to judicial restraint either.  Most of the clerks were liberal.  Most of
their Justices were liberal.  The legal academy was liberal.  The cutting edge
theoretical debates pitted law and economics against CLS.  Forming a
133 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (2012); AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION (2005); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
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rearguard action in favor of judicial restraint was not a popular move.
Despite these obstacles, a small group of conservative clerks drew inspiration
from the judges whom they clerked for—Harlan, Powell, and White on the
Supreme Court and Henry Friendly on the Second Circuit.  As originalism
became more popular among center-right academics and rights protection
became the rallying cry on the left, they rejected both trends.  Former clerks
including Paul Bator, Jesse Choper, and Charles Fried became judicial
restraint holdouts.134
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, a University of Virginia law professor until he was
appointed to the Fourth Circuit, has been the leading voice of the judicial
restraint holdouts.135  Wilkinson’s advocacy of judicial restraint did not
require a resuscitation of Bickel or process theory.  Rather, Wilkinson
rejected all normative constitutional theory.  He believed that originalists
were as activist as rights protectors/living constitutionalists.136  He rejected
process theory, including Ely’s Democracy and Distrust, as a “third way down a
rabbit hole” as well as Posner’s pragmatism.137  Given the failure of all consti-
tutional theory, Wilkinson argued that judges should restrain themselves and
play less intrusive roles in American democracy.138  Others, including Cass
Sunstein, have previously advocated judicial minimalism.139
Despite Wilkinson’s best efforts, constitutional theory largely remains a
battle between rights protectors and originalists.  Process theory lost the bat-
tle of ideas, the victim of a squeeze play between post-realism on the left and
law and economics on the right.  A new generation of Supreme Court clerks
turned academics have sought to change that.  Like Wilkinson and other
members of the judicial restraint holdouts, they recognized that both rights
protection and originalism promoted the greatest evil of all—judicial
supremacy.
III. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IS NOT DEAD—IT’S NOT EVEN PAST
  There are no new ideas in American constitutional law.  Old ideas masquer-
ade as new ideas under new names.  Today’s popular constitutionalism looks
134 Bator became the lead author of Hart and Wechsler’s Federal Courts casebook. PAUL
M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d
ed. 1973).
135 J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (2012).
136 Id. at 11–32 (describing living constitutionalism as “activism unleashed”); id. at
33–59 (describing originalism as “activism masquerading as restraint”). But see DAVID A.
STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (defending a common law, precedent-based
approach).
137 WILKINSON, supra note 135, at 60–79 (on Ely); id. at 80–103 (on Posner and
pragmatism).
138 Id. at 104–16.
139 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, at ix (1999) (stating that the goal of his book
“is to identify and defend a distinctive form of judicial decision-making, which I call
‘minimalism’”).
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a lot like the process theory and judicial restraint of the 1950s and 1960s.140
Both popular constitutionalism and process theory rejected judicial
supremacy.  Both preferred to avoid constitutional questions and to decide
them through the democratic political process.  And both objected to the
infiltration of partisan politics into judicial decision making.  What goes
around comes around.
During the mid-1980s, late Burger Court clerks entered the legal acad-
emy.  Neither rights protection nor originalism appealed to them.  They fin-
ished their clerkships disillusioned by the politicization of Supreme Court
decision making and with the Court’s embrace of judicial supremacy.  That
disillusionment only increased as the Burger Court yielded to the Rehnquist
Court, and decisions such as City of Boerne v. Flores141 continued to aggrandize
the Court’s power at the expense of the other branches and the states.
Larry Kramer (Brennan OT 1985) was one of these disillusioned
Supreme Court clerks turned academics.142  As a law clerk to Judge Henry
Friendly on the Second Circuit, Kramer marveled at Friendly’s pride of judi-
cial craftsmanship and obsession with getting the law right (as opposed to
choosing an outcome based on his political or policy preferences and then
justifying it in a way that achieved a majority opinion).143  After clerking for
Friendly, clerking for William Brennan was a culture shock.144  Kramer liked
and admired Brennan but was appalled by how much of the Court’s decision
making had been infected by politics.145  Even the clerks were politically
polarized.146  Brennan contributed to that polarization by telling his clerks
that the most important rule was the rule of five.147  “Five votes,” he said
while holding up his hand and wiggling his fingers.  “Five votes can do any-
140 Snyder, supra note 33, at 349 (linking Thayerian judicial restraint and popular
constitutionalism).
141 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as
exceeding Congress’s Section 5 power under the Fourteenth Amendment).
142 See Brad Snyder, The Judicial Genealogy (and Mythology) of John Roberts: Clerkships from
Gray to Brandeis to Friendly to Roberts, 71 OHIO ST. L. REV. 1149, 1222 (2010).
143 Id. (citing Letter from Larry Kramer to Henry J. Friendly, at 1–2 (Sept. 25, 1985)
(Henry Friendly Papers, Harvard Law School, Special Collections Library, Box 221, Folder
221-6)).
144 Id. (citing Letter from Larry Kramer to Henry J. Friendly, at 1–2 (Sept. 25, 1985)
(Henry Friendly Papers, Harvard Law School, Special Collections Library, Box 221, Folder
221-6)).
145 Id. Kramer believed that Thurgood Marshall provided the fourth vote to grant cert
in Bowers v. Hardwick because Kramer had circulated a memo that mistakenly indicated
that Brennan would vote to grant cert. SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN
497–98 (2010).
146 EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 419 (1998) (revealing a conservative and lib-
eral clerk fought in the courtyard of the Supreme Court and fell into the fountain). But see
Alex Kozinski, Conduct Unbecoming, 108 YALE L.J. 835, 877 (1999) (reviewing Closed Cham-
bers and taking Lazarus (Blackmun OT 1988) to task for breaching law clerk confidentiality
and for such disclosures).
147 Nat Hentoff, Profiles: The Constitutionalist, NEW YORKER, Mar. 12, 1990, at 60.
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thing around here.”148  Across the political spectrum, judicial supremacy
reigned supreme.  Friendly’s emphasis on rule of law and judicial minimal-
ism was nowhere in sight.
Fed up with judicial supremacy and the politicization of the Supreme
Court, Kramer published a 2004 book, The People Themselves, which offered an
escape from judicial supremacy and a reinvigoration of the democratic politi-
cal process—popular constitutionalism.149  Besides its opposition to judicial
supremacy and belief that the people as opposed to the Court should have
the last word in interpreting the Constitution, popular constitutionalism
lacked a precise working definition.150  When pressed about how popular
constitutionalism would work in practice, Kramer offered a vision of depart-
mentalism in which each branch would play a co-equal role in interpreting
the Constitution.151
Kramer was not alone in championing popular or populist constitution-
alism.152  He was joined by prior generations of law professors.  Mark
Tushnet, a charter member of CLS, called for the abolition of judicial review
and a return to populist constitutionalism.153  Robert Post (Brennan OT
1978) and Reva Siegel articulated a theory of democratic constitutionalism in
which the Court engages in dialogue with the elected branches.154  Bruce
Ackerman (Harlan OT 1968), another former Friendly clerk, advanced a the-
ory of non–Article V amendments known as “constitutional moments” that
emphasized presidential elections and landmark legislation such as the New
Deal.155  For Ackerman, the heroes and triumphs of the Civil Rights Move-
ment were not the Warren Court, Brown v. Board of Education, or Baker v. Carr,
but the protesters led by Dr. King and elected officials (like Lyndon Johnson
and Everett Dirksen) who facilitated the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965 that Ackerman dubbed “landmark stat-
utes.”156  During the mid-1990s, William Eskridge and Philip Frickey (Mar-
shall OT 1978) contributed to a growing revival of legal process theory.157
148 Id.
149 See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004); Larry D. Kramer,
Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959 (2004); Larry D. Kramer, The
Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5 (2001).
150 Snyder, supra note 33, at 348 & n.18.
151 See KRAMER, supra note 149, at 6; Larry Kramer, Response, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1173,
1176 (2006).
152 See RICHARD D. PARKER, “HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE” 4–5 (1994); JAMIN B. RASKIN,
OVERRULING DEMOCRACY 1–2 (2003).
153 See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 154 (1999).
154 Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 374 (2007).
155 See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); 1 BRUCE ACKER-
MAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
156 Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1768–70, 1781–82,
1786–87 (2007); see id. at 1742, 1761, 1792 (referencing “landmark statutes”). See generally
3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014).
157 See supra notes 17, 21 & 24.
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Pam Karlan (Blackmun OT 1985) wrote a 2012 Harvard Law Review fore-
word, Democracy and Disdain, which criticized the Court’s recent decisions
about the Affordable Care Act and other statutes as contemptuous of democ-
racy.158  She correctly predicted that Shelby County v. Holder159 would chip
away at the Voting Rights Act.160  As a rights protector since her Blackmun
clerkship, from her work as a voting rights lawyer with the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund to her Supreme Court advocacy as a Stanford law professor,
Karlan may have written her foreword more as a rhetorical move rather than
a switch from the rights protector to popular constitutionalist camps.  One
wonders what she thought of Scalia’s dissent in United States v. Windsor161
arguing that the best way to overturn DOMA was through the democratic
political process.162  Is the lesson of Windsor that the only rule that matters is
Brennan’s rule of five?  If so, then CLS’s indeterminacy thesis appears to be
carrying the day.
Popular constitutionalism suffers from the same flaws as process theory/
judicial restraint—neither theory provides any normative guidance on when
the Court should strike down a statute or executive action.  Kramer rejects
this critique of popular constitutionalism as implicitly suggesting that the
Court is the only branch that can declare something to be unconstitutional
and that the Court has been effective in protecting rights.163  The people
and their elected representatives are just as capable of interpreting the Con-
stitution and protecting rights through the legislative and electoral processes.
But Posner correctly observed that Thayerian judicial restraint died in part
because it provided an inadequate guide to judges about when to abandon
their restraint, about when extreme cases mean extreme.164  The same can
be said of popular constitutionalism.
The lack of normative guidance from process theory or popular constitu-
tionalism does not mean that either theory should be jettisoned.  Rather,
what is needed is more legal theory and legal history about how to put these
theories into practice.  A good start would be taking Felix Frankfurter’s juris-
prudence seriously and rereading his dissent in Baker v. Carr.165  Another
positive step would be a reconsideration of the constitutional avoidance
scholarship of Alexander Bickel.  Finally, scholars should dig deeper into the
constitutional scholarship of James Bradley Thayer—what motivated Thayer
at the time; why his theory attracted leading legal thinkers including Holmes,
158 Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Foreword: Democracy and Disdain,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012).
159 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (striking down section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act).
160 Karlan, supra note 158, at 69–70.
161 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
162 Id. at 2697–2703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (urging respect for “democratically adopted
legislation,” rejecting judicial supremacy, and arguing that there was no Article III case or
controversy).
163 Email from Larry Kramer to author (Jan. 11, 2012) (on file with author).
164 Posner, supra note 1, at 533.
165 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Snyder, supra note 33, at 346,
411–15.
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Brandeis, and Frankfurter; and why early twentieth century progressives
embraced Thayerian judicial restraint.
CONCLUSION
The point of this Article is to show that the liberal decisions of the War-
ren Court were not the sole cause of death of judicial restraint; developments
in legal theory also played a role.  A new generation of law professors had
recently finished clerking on the Warren Court and early Burger Court and
rejected the legal process theory that they had learned as law students.  Most
gravitated to new and exciting theories—rights protection, post-realism, law
and economics, and originalism.  And the judicial restraint holdouts lacked
the numbers and prolific scholars to object.  It remains to be seen whether
popular constitutionalism championed by the next generation of clerks-
turned-academics augurs a return to process theory and Thayerian judicial
restraint.
